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Summary
Previous empirical work suggests that rms with high environmental performance tend to be pro table, but questions persist about the nature of the relationship. Does stronger environmental performance really lead to better nancial performance, or is the observed relationship the outcome of some other underlying rm attribute? Does it pay to have clean-running facilities or to have facilities in relatively clean industries? To explore these questions, we analyze 652 U.S. manufacturing rms over the time period 1987 ±1996. Although we nd evidence of an association between lower pollution and higher nancial valuation, we nd that a rm's xed characteristics and strategic position might cause this association. Our ndings suggest that " When does it pay to be green?" may be a more important question than " Does it pay to be green?" Journal of Industrial Ecology Scholars had long assumed that investments to protect the natural environment provided fewnancial bene ts to rms. In the last 20 years, however, a growing number of researchers have challenged this assumption. In the eld of industry ecology, scholars argue that there are situations where beyond-compliance behavior by rms is a win-win for both the environment and the rm (Nelson 1994; Panayotou and Zinnes 1994; Esty and Porter 1998; Reinhardt 1999) . Scholars now suggest that rms may be both green and competitive (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Reinhardt 1999) . Qualitative research has identi ed numerous examples of pro table pollution prevention opportunities (Denton 1994; Deutsch 1998; Graedel and Allenby 1995; Porter and van der Linde 1995; King 1995) . Many scholars now argue that discretionary improvements in environmental performance often provide nancial bene t (e.g., Hart 1997) .
In response, a growing empirical literature shows that researchers have applied econometric techniques to test the "pays to be green" hypothesis. Several studies have provided evidence that higher environmental performance is associated with better nancial performance, but these early studies often lacked the longitudinal data needed to fully test the relationship. Several years of data are needed if one wants to rule out rival explanations for the apparent association or show that environmental improvement causes nancial gain. Furthermore, the empirical literature does not clarify whether the apparent association is generated by a rm's choice to operate in cleaner industries or to operate cleaner facilities. Existing research cannot answer whether it pays to be green or whether it pays to operate in green industries.
In this article, we review and comment on the empirical "pays to be green" literature. We discuss how a rm's stable attributes (i.e., the characteristics of the rm that persist over time) and strategic position may jointly cause both lower pollution levels and better nancial performance and thereby create the appearance of a direct relationship between the two. For example, innovative rms may have both lower emissions levels and greater pro ts. Alternatively, managers may choose to improve their rm's environmental performance when they have an especially pro table year.
To help distinguish the effect of pollution reduction from other underlying factors, we adopt empirical methods that account for unmeasured rm attributes. Furthermore, to differentiate between pollution reduction and divestiture of operations in dirtier industries, we separate environmental performance into two constructs: 1) relative performance within a given industry and 2) the average performance of the industries in which one chooses to operate. We analyze 652 U.S. manufacturing rms over the time period 1987-1996. We nd evidence of a real association between lower pollution and higher nancial performance. We also show that a rm's environmental performance relative to its industry is associated with higher nancial performance. We cannot show conclusively, however, that a rm's choice to operate in cleaner industries is associated with better nancial performance, nor can we prove the causal direction of the observed relationships. Thus, our research provides support for a connection between some means of pollution reduction and nancial performance, but it also suggests that the reason for this connection remains to be established.
Evidence to Date
Proponents of a causal link between environmental and nancial performance have argued that pollution reduction provides future cost savings by increasing ef ciency, reducing compliance costs, and minimizing future liabilities (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Reinhardt 1999). Porter and van der Linde (1995) theorized that opportunities for pro table pollution reduction exist because managers often lack the experience and skill to understand the full cost of pollution (Jaffe et al. 1995) . Hart (1997) proposes that excess returns (i.e., pro ts above the industry average) result from differences in the underlying environmental capabilities of rms. Managers may possess unique resources or capabilities that allow them to employ pro table environmental strategies that are dif cult to imitate.
Using a variety of measures (tables 1 and 2), much of the empirical "pays to be green" litera- Table 1 Measures of corporate nancial performance used in ª pays to be greenº scholarship
Measure Description Examples
Tobin's q Firm market valuation over replacement value of assets Dowell et al. (2000) Return on Assets The ratio of income to total assets Hart and Ahuja (1996) , Russo and Fouts (1997) 
Return on Equity
The ratio of income to rm equity Hart and Ahuja (1996) , Russo and Fouts (1997) 
Return on Investment
The ratio of operating income to book value of assets Hart and Ahuja (1996) , Russo and Fouts (1997) Russo and Fouts (1997) ture has supported the proposed positive relationship between pollution reduction and nancial gain by relying on correlative studies of environmental and nancial performance. A series of studies conducted by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) in the 1970s found that expenditures on pollution control were signicantly correlated with nancial performance among a sample of pulp and paper rms (Spicer 1978) . 1 More recently, Russo and Fouts (1997) found a signi cant positive correlation between various nancial returns and an index of environmental performance developed by the CEP. Dowell and colleagues (2000) found that rms that adopt a single, stringent environmental standard worldwide have higher market valuation (Tobin's q) than rms that do not adopt such standards.
In the nance literature, a number of studies have examined the market returns of portfolios of environmentally friendly rms. Cohen and colleagues (1995) used several measures of environmental performance derived from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) databases to construct two industry-balanced portfolios of rms. They found no penalty for investing in the green portfolio and a positive return to green investing. Similarly, White (1996) found a signi cantly higher risk-adjusted return for a portfolio of green rms using the CEP ratings of environmental performance.
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To the extent that one cares merely about correlation and little about causation, these correlative studies are informative. Market analysts, for example, increasingly gather environmental performance data as an indicator of future capital market returns (Kiernan 1998) . For their purposes, it matters little whether environmental performance leads to nancial performance or simply provides an indicator of rms that have high nancial performance.
From the perspective of corporate managers and policy analysts, however, the distinction is critical. The prescription that often follows from the "pays to be green" literature is that managers should make investments to lower their rm's en-vironmental impact (Hart and Ahuja 1996) . To fully demonstrate that it pays to be green, research must demonstrate that environmental improvements produce nancial gain.
Event studies are one means of demonstrating that greening indeed causes nancial gain. Such studies look at the relative changes in stock price following some environmental event. By isolating a single environmental event within a narrow time frame, event studies control for important differences among rms that cannot be observed. The limitation with event studies is that they often study the effect of events that are only partially environmental in nature. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) , White (1996) , Karpoff and colleagues (1998) , and Jones and Rubin (1999) studied the effect of published reports of events and awards on rm valuation and found a relationship between the valence of the event (positive or negative) and the resulting change in market valuation. Blacconiere and Patten (1994) estimated that Union Carbide lost $1 billion in market capitalization, or 28%, following the Bhopal chemical accident in 1984. Muoghalu and colleagues (1990) found that rms named in lawsuits concerning improper disposal of hazardous waste suffered signi cant losses in capital market value. Each of these events has environmental elements, but each is affected by other rm attributes. King and Baerwald (1998) argued that size, market power, and unique rm characteristics in uence how events are reported and interpreted. A rm with good public relations may be able to put a positive spin on negative news. A rm that possesses good legal resources may better forestall lawsuits.
In some event studies, researchers have sought to avoid these problems by using the annual release of toxic emission data through the U.S. EPA's Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program as the event. Hamilton (1995) , Konar and Cohen (1997) , and Khanna and colleagues (1998) all found that polluting rms lost market value in a one-day window following the release of TRI information. These important studies still may suffer from construct validity, however. Given the complexity of analyzing TRI data, it seems possible that same-day stock price movements probably re ect contemporaneously reported pollution rankings. These rankings are strongly affected by rm size and industry choice, and thus the stock market effect may be the result of temporary bad press rather than a real change in perception of a rm's long-term value. In fact, stock values often return to pre-event levels within a ve-day window following the TRI data release. Proponents of event studies, however, claim that the return of the price to pre-event levels is most likely to be a response to new, unrelated information.
Another way to account for unobserved rm differences is to use standard regression techniques to evaluate the effect of changes in pollution on changes in nancial performance. This in essence is the approach used in a widely cited study by Hart and Ahuja (1996) . They showed that changes in pollution (emission per sales dollar) predate changes in nancial performance. Although an important advance in the literature, their measure of environmental performance con ates reduction of pollution at current operations and divestiture of dirty operations, making it dif cult to interpret the meaning of their study. Is it that it pays to be green or does it pay to operate in clean industries?
This issue underscores a larger debate within the strategy literature on the source of returns in excess of investments of similar risk (Rumelt 1991; McGahan and Porter 1997) . The industrial organization literature in economics suggests that excess returns result from differences in the underlying structure of industries. According to this logic, greener industries may have higher returns than dirtier industries because of lower compliance and regulatory costs. In contrast, the resource-based view of strategic management suggests that individual rm capabilities may lead to excess returns when they are dif cult to imitate, not substitutable, rare, and valuable (Barney 1986; Wernerfelt 1984) . According to this view, superior ability to manage environmental problems relative to others in your industry may lead to higher returns. In much of the empirical "pays to be green" literature, researchers have used strategy resource-based logic to justify a relationship between environmental and nancial performance. Unfortunately, they fail to disentangle the effects of industry choice from the effects of variation in environmental strategies among rms in the same industry.
An Empirical Approach
In the following sections, we analyze whether it really "pays to be green" using a methodology that allows us to explore whether unmeasured rm and industry characteristics may explain the observed link between environmental and nancial performance. We also use a measure of environmental performance that untangles the effect of a rm's relative performance within its industries and the average performance of the industries in which it chooses to be.
We created a sample of publicly traded U.S. manufacturing rms during the period 1987 -1996 by combining the U.S. EPA's Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) with facility data from Dun & Bradstreet and corporate data from Standard & Poor's Compustat database. The U.S. EPA started the TRI in 1987 to track emissions of more than 200 toxic chemicals from U.S. manufacturing rms. Facilities must complete annual TRI reports if they manufacture or process 25,000 pounds (or about 11,340 kg), use more than 10,000 pounds of any listed chemical during a calendar year, and employ ten or more full-time people. To be in our sample, a rm must have at least one facility that meets these requirements and be among the public corporations listed in the Compustat database. Matching the two sets, we created an unbalanced sample of 652 rms constituting 4,483 rm-year observations for the years 1987 through 1996.
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Measures
Financial Performance
The dependent variable for our analysis isnancial performance as re ected by Tobin's q. Tobin's q measures the market valuation of a rm relative to the replacement costs of tangible assets (Lindenberg and Ross 1981) . Essentially, it re ects what cash ows the market thinks a rm will provide per dollar invested in assets. It should be higher if future cash ows are expected to be greater or if they are expected to be less risky. In accordance with more recent "pays to be green" studies, we use a simpli ed measure of Tobin's q (Dowell et al. 2000) . We calculated Tobin's q by dividing the sum of rm equity value, book value of long-term debt, and net current liabilities by the book value of total assets. 4 All nancial data were obtained from the Compustat database.
Environmental Performance
Previous research has measured the environmental performance of a rm as the degree to which that rm emits toxic pollution given its size (Hart and Ahuja 1996) . We create a similar measure (Total Emissions) by calculating the log of total facility emissions of toxic chemicals. Unfortunately, the meaning of this variable is ambiguous because it confounds pollution that results from industry positioning with pollution that results from poor environmental management. Consequently, we form two additional variables to separate the effect of environmental management from the effect of industry positioning. Relative Emissions measures the rm's ability to manage and reduce its pollution by comparing the degree to which a rm's facilities are more or less polluting than other facilities in the same industry (measured by the four-digit Standard Industrial Classi cation (SIC) code and adjusted for differences in size). Industry Emissions measures the degree to which a rm tends to operate in industries where production entails pollution. If a rm operates in industries where the average facility has higher emissions, this variable will have a larger value. Please refer to the appendix for a detailed description of the construction of these variables.
Controls
We include a number of measures commonly used in the analysis of nancial performance as controls (tables 3 and 4). These measures include 1) the company's size (Firm Size) calculated as the log of the company's assets, 2) the capital intensity of a rm (Capital Intensity) calculated by dividing capital expenditures by sales, 3) the annual growth of the rm (Growth) calculated as the percentage change in sales, 4) the degree to which the rm is leveraged (Leverage) divided as the ratio of its debt to assets, and 5) the research and development intensity (R&D Intensity) calculated by dividing research and development expenses by total assets.
In addition, we control for the stringency of the regulatory environment in which the rm Journal of Industrial Ecology operates (Regulatory Stringency). Environmental regulation varies across regions and imposes greater (or lesser) penalties for pollution from facilities operating in those regions. We measure a state's regulatory stringency by calculating the inverse of the log of toxic emissions divided by total employees in four main polluting industries: chemicals, petroleum, pulp and paper, and materials processing (Meyer 1995) . The logic for this measure is that higher regulation leads to lower emissions per employee (for these industries) and thus increases the inverse of this ratio (Regulatory Stringency). For each rm, we create a measure of the average regulation it faces by calculating the weighted-average of the regulatory stringency for all the states in which the rm operates.
To create an alternative measure of the degree to which the different facilities in our sample are regulated, we count the number of performance criteria with which each facility must comply (i.e., the number of permits issued to a facility). Under the U.S. Clean Water Act (CWA 1977) , regulators may impose limits on water ow, suspended solids, and chemical concentration. Although guidelines exist for administering the law, substantial discretionary power remains. We created an alternative measure of regulatory stringency, Permits, by summing the number of federal permits and then dividing by rm size.
Results
Previous studies have found that pollution precedes poor nancial performance by one or more years (Hart and Ahuja 1996) . To test these ndings, we use least-squares regression analysis to nd a linear relationship between our independent variables and the rm's future Tobin's q (table 5) . 5 Because rms may differ in ways that we do not capture with our independent variables, we include dummy variables that allow each rm to have a different constant value. This is often called a " xed effects" analysis because it reduces the possibility that a rm's xed attributes confound the analysis. In essence, this xed-effect regression requires that changes in independent variables (rather than their baseline level) be associated with changes in dependent variables.
Consistent with much of the "pays to be green" literature, we nd that Total Emissions is associated with superior nancial performance even when controlling for rm xed effects (model 1). Thus, we provide evidence that environmental performance is associated withnancial performance rather than the observed relationship being the outcome of some other underlying rm attribute. As discussed earlier, evidence of such a relationship still leaves many unanswered questions. Does it pay to have clean-running facilities, or to have facilities in relatively clean industries? To better account for these differences, we separate Total Emissions into two parts that re ect a rm's tendency to operate in polluting industries (Industry Emissions) and its tendency to operate dirtier facilities within these industries (Relative Emissions). In model 2, the signi cant and negative coef cient for Relative Emissions indicates that rms with lower emissions in their industries tend to experience higher nancial performance in the subsequent year. The lack of signi cance for the coef cient for Industry Emissions means that we cannot conclude that rms that operate in cleaner industries have higher nancial performance.
One problem with xed effects analysis is that it can do its job too well. By eliminating the effect of all rm attributes that are relatively constant, the xed effect may obscure evidence that a xed attribute is actually important. If rms do not frequently change industry, and thus industry position is relatively constant, we might miss the nancial effect of industry choice. To check this, we use an alternative speci cation called "random effects." Although this method continues to reduce the effect of xed rm attributes, it assumes that these are normally distributed. This method suggests that rms that operate in cleaner industries (Industry Emissions) have higher nancial performance.
What might explain the difference between model 3 and model 2? One possibility is that few rms in our sample actually move across industries, and thus the xed effects analysis removes the effect of industry position. Another possibility is that rms bene t from being in cleaner industries but not from moving to cleaner industries. Perhaps such movement entails costs that reduce a rm's valuation or signals some dif culty or problem. It is important to note that in our particular case, statistical tests suggest that the xed effects and not random effects analysis should carry more credence. tend to experience higher nancial performance. Thus, although we nd evidence of an association between reduced emissions and pro t, we cannot say with con dence which way the relationship runs. We again nd no evidence that the cleanliness of the industries in which the rm has facilities (Industry Emissions) is associated with higher market valuation when we control for rm xed effects. The above analysis is illustrative of what we found throughout our analysis. Using different forms of models and different methods for measuring our variables, we often found an association between environmental and nancial performance; however, we also found that variations in model speci cation, sample, and measurement method could reduce the signi cance of this effect below accepted thresholds (although it never reversed in sign). Out of the population of models we estimated, we have presented the most careful speci cations and robust results.
Conclusions
In this paper, we further explore whether it "pays to be green." We use longitudinal data and statistical methods that reduce the potential for unobserved differences among rms to create a misleading association between environmental and nancial performance. We also test to see whether pollution reduction causes nancial gain. Table 6 presents a summary of these results. We nd evidence of an association between pollution reduction and nancial gain, but we cannot prove the direction of causality. We also show that rms in cleaner industries have a higher Tobin's q, but we are unable to rule out possible confounding effects from xed rm attributes. Moreover, we cannot show that rms that move to cleaner industries improve theirnancial performance. Our research provides both additional support for the "pays to be green" hypothesis and suggests caution in interpreting its implications. Much of the variance in our study is attributed to rmlevel differences. Better understanding of these differences might provide a richer understanding of pro table environmental improvement. It may be that it pays to reduce pollution by certain means and not others. Alternatively, it may be that only rms with certain attributes can profitably reduce their pollution.
Additional research is needed to explore how underlying rm characteristics affect the relationship between relative environmental performance and nancial performance. The relationship between underlying capabilities and environmental management is likely to be complex and contingent. Environmental management and other capabilities may prove to be complementarities. Depending on industrial conditions, different bundles of capabilities may be important. Our research suggests that rm attributes and different strategies for environmental improvement may moderate the apparent link. It suggests that "When does it pay to be green?" may be a more important question than "Does it pay to be green?" Notes 1. Interestingly, a follow-up study by Chen and Metcalf (1980) found that the effect disappeare d when the analysis corrected for differences in size. 2. In contrast, White (1995) found that a group of six mutual funds that employed environmentally responsible screens performed worse than the Standard & Poor 500 in both nominal and riskadjusted terms. White resolved the contradiction between the two ndings by concluding that environmental performance and nancial performance are indeed correlated , but managers of environmentally oriented mutual funds are less skilled than managers of other funds. 3. Such a sample is often referred to as a panel or longitudinal data set because we have multiple observation s of the same entity over time. 4. We did not use the more complicate d measure of Tobin's q as proposed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) because past research in this domain has found little qualitative difference between this measure and the simpli ed version used in this analysis (Dowell et al. 2000) . We chose to use Tobin's q rather than accounting measures ofnancial performance, such as return on assets or return on sales, because Tobin's q re ects expected future gains. 5. Ordinary least squares analysis is a technique for estimating the parameters of a mathematical model by minimizing the square of the difference between actual data and the predicted model. 6. Performing a Hausman test on the random-effects model suggests that a random-effect s speci cation is recommended over a xed-effect s speci cation. 7. Estimating the model with a lagged dependent variable increases the likelihood of serial correlation. We use an instrumental variables ap-Journal of Industrial Ecology proach to correct for this potential problem. The lagged values of the exogenous regressors are used as instruments. These regressors have the desirable property that they will not be correlate d with the error but will be correlate d with the lagged value of the dependent variable.
